By River Nuñez
This essay compares conceptions of realism held by traditional realists and John Dewey. It focuses on the difference between causal versus non-causal impacts human thought has on the external world. In this essay I prove that Dewey’s understanding of non-causal impact fits better into the human understanding of the world instead of the traditional realist view. By using the example of gender identity, I prove that even though there are some concerns with believing that human thought has a non-causal impact on the world, it better explains individuals’ worldview and our experience with the external world.
Introduction
In Godfrey-Smith’s Dewey and the Question of Realism, we are presented with two similar but competing views of reality, that of classical realist and that of John Dewey. Though both these views are based on a naturalist understanding of the world, they differ in one important distinction; the causal impact humans have the reality we inhabit. For John Dewey the world is constructed and reconstructed from the thoughts we have about it, but for the traditional realist “there is no other sense in which any non-mental part of the world is dependent for its existence or nature on what people do or could think.”[1] At the core of Dewey’s metaphysics is the belief that thought itself can produce non-causal changes to the external world, something the classical realist would disagree with. Both positions would agree that thought causes action and action itself can change the external world, but to say that thought alone can cause these changes seems far-fetched and overly complicated. I will concede that it is extremely over complicated, but definitely not as far-fetched as the classical realist would argue. I will try to disprove the classical realist by giving an example of a largely understood mental (internal) phenomena and show that our thoughts about this phenomena cause “new potencies and new capacities”[2] that cause true external changes in the world around us. Through his lens of construction and reconstruction, Dewey helps us understand the metaphysical positioning of identity and how potentials, when confronted in the external world, can cause serious changes to our understanding of the reality we live in. Dewey’s understanding of the non-causal relationship thought has on the external world allows for an understanding of trans identity, and human identity in general, that is impossible if we take the classical realist construction.
Metaphysics: Dewey versus the Realist
As explained very briefly, the dissent between the classic realist view and that of Dewey has to do with the causal impact human thought has on the external world. Dewey explains that the action of thought has causal and non-causal powers to affect the external world. By causal we mean that thought causes action, and in turn action in the physical world affects change to our external surroundings. By non-causal, we mean that thought can change our perception of objects, places, and people in our external world. The traditional realist believes that in order to change or manipulate the external we must force action upon it. They believe that for the external world to be affected it must be through causal powers, thought. Dewey’s theory states that when we gain new knowledge, it creates an entire realm of possibilities for action that were not possible before. These new possibilities in turn create entirely new relations between the object of the external world and the mind that thinks about it.[3] Both traditional realists and Dewey alike agree that thought can causallychange the external world, they disagree that thought can non-causally affect the external world.
Dewey believes that the act of forming new knowledge can non-casually change the external world. When we are in the act of knowing, we form and construct new knowledge of the outside world which then in turn changes the objects we are forming new knowledge about.
A fact when it is known enters into a new environment. Without ceasing to belong to the physical environment it enters also into a medium of human activities, of desires and aversions, habits and instincts. It thereby gains new potencies, new capacities.[4]
These changes are not to be understood as physical changes to the object dependent upon action on the object itself, but rather non-causal changes in which the way we think about objects change how that object is known. As stated before, new knowledge creates new possibilities and these possibilities cause new relations. Dewey wants to state that, “Because of the establishment of these relations, changes are made to objects by thought even before any new actions have been performed.”[5] The realist tells us that thought causes action which in turn effects the external world, but new relations between minds and the external world are not sufficient to cause actual change to the external world. These are what we categorize as non-causal changes to external objects; when thought causes changes to objects themselves in the external world without action being taken. When Dewey states that, “the activity of knowing does not leave things as they are but transforms them,”[6] he is stating that thought has the power to have non-causal impact on the world around us.
The best way to understand this distinction is with an example of a shelled nut.[7] In front of you there is a shelled nut, but you have no idea how to crack it in order to eat it. The realist would tell us that in order to change the nut in the external world, we need to exert action upon it like applying force to crack and open it. Dewey would say the second you thought up a way in which crack the nut, you have non-causally changed that nut. The nut has become “accessible”[8] thus changing the object known and causing a string of new potential actions and knowledge about that nutmeat. “Knowing changes the object known because it changes the relationship we have to the object”[9] What Dewey wants to distinguish in this example is the fact that it’s not just our relations and thought that changes, but the object itself object itself has changed, because it has caused a new realm of “new potencies and new capacities.”[10] Dewey’s view goes even further by stating that the meaning of this object has also changed because the new relations and potentialities that came from this new knowledge have also changed the role the object has in our lives.[11] The accessibility of the nut has now transformed the nut into an object of new meaning, knowledge, and potential, all of which change the nut’s object to a different form than what we knew before.
Realists disagree with this conception because they believe that giving thought the power to change the external world is an extremely odd claim, and, even worse, changing the meaning of objects with such ease can lead to confusion to the larger society of what the object truly is. A realist may agree with Dewey in saying that our relation to an object is changed from the new knowledge we gain about that object, but they would not agree that knowledge forming can change the intrinsic nature of objects. In response to Dewey’s view, realists make a distinction between real changes and Cambridge changes. The realist defines “real changes” as “changes to intrinsic properties. (...) intrinsic properties are properties an object has which do not require, or rule out, the existence of anything other than that object.”[12] Cambridge changes then become any changes made to an object’s extrinsic properties, properties that do not involve changing the nature of the object itself but only the relational properties it has to the rest of the mind. Real changes to objects’ intrinsic properties are only possible when something in the physical world affects an object; smashing the nut, changing its atomic structure, etc. The realist would classify the changes that Dewey ascribes from thought as Cambridge changes to extrinsic properties of an object, a change in someone’s mind about an object is insufficient to change the intrinsic properties of that object.
Dewey tells us that making these distinctions forces us to think of the properties of objects as disconnected, separating the intrinsic and extrinsic properties is both impossible and incorrect. When we distinguish these properties we are devaluing the significance of the object’s connection, potencies and capacities, of which are needed to fully understand the objects position in the world, both mental and externally.[13] When we think about the external world, we cannot separate the “nature” of the object (whatever that is supposed to mean, maybe something close to an “essence”) and the relations we make about the objects in our mind. They are interconnected and without this understanding, the external world becomes a mess of separation and incoherence that the realist seems to miss. Dewey’s realism requires holism that includes both the external and internal world of human experience, something the realist does not want to allow in our theorizing of the external world.
The realist wants to go against this kind of overreaching holism that is inherently apart of Dewey’s metaphysical theorizing, as it forces us to accept that not only is meaning and action dependent on mind, but it is also dependent on everything we think about everything else. By deciding that thought has just as much power as action, Dewey is forcing us to believe that everything in the world is dependent upon everything else we may think about it, leaving there to be no solid meaning within the external world for which we can communicate. The realist worries that without making the distinction between real and Cambridge changes there is, “no way of distinguishing these connections from a multitude of other ones, which have nothing to do with links between thought and action.”[14] By getting rid of the distinctions between real and Cambridge changes, Dewey asks that we commit to an understanding of the word that is completely dependent on thought
The realist account of thought and action and its relation to the external world are I think Godfrey-Smith’s example of a shelled nut is enough for us to understand Dewey’s theory, but it is not apt to show the significance of it. In order to fully understand its importance, I think we need to change our example of a nut, to an example that we care far more about; our identity. If we can apply Dewey’s theory to objects in the external world, and human beings are a part of the natural order, then this theory must apply to us. When we think about human nature, we do not restrict our understanding to only the physical aspects of our body, we consider how we identify ourselves as essential to understanding our nature. The way in which we construct ourselves internally, where we position ourselves in larger society, largely affects how we view and understand the external world. I don’t believe the realist would disagree with this notion, but they seemingly would disagree with the idea that our construction of the self has the power to change and reconstruct the external world around us. The reason I am skeptical of the realist account is because it seemingly cannot allow for the metaphysical position that is essential to understanding trans and queer identities. Without the consideration of Dewey’s holism, trans and queer understandings of the world are completely erased.
Habit: The Mental Construction of Gender
In Shannon Sullivan’s paper Reconfiguring Gender with John Dewey: Habit, Bodies and Cultural Change, she considers the connection between gender performativity as conceived by Judith Butler and habit as conceived by Dewey. Both are thought of in conjunction with action in the outside world, but it becomes obvious the significance of the internalized nature of these properties when constructing the self and its identity. Dewey believes that the way in which we understand our existence is through the construction, and reconstruction, of what he calls habits. Habit can be understood as similar to the notion of performativity. Cultural norms produce a repetition of acts that are deemed acceptable for certain people in certain situations that become so engrained into human behavior and understanding, that they are acted upon without conscious thought.[15] What’s important to note about both habit and performativity, is the fact they are both socially constructed and reconstructed, “individual habits are formed under conditions set by cultural configurations that precede the individual, which means that cultural customs delimit the particular gendered and other options available to the individual and thus tend to reproduce themselves through individuals’ habits.”[16]
For Dewey habit is not only the repeated actions we learn over time, but it is through there construction that we as individuals can find our own agency. “We are our habits; they are our very structure as corporeal, bodily selves; thus there is no thinking of who we are apart from the habits we embody.”[17] It is through the construction of our habits that we can then form part of our identities. As we develop different patterns of action, so too do we develop different patterns of understanding the external world. As we go through our life we change and adapt these patterns of actions to better suit the way we think about the world. The way we think about the world as well as our patterns of action develop and inform each other throughout our lives, changing and reforming constantly. It is through this constant negotiation of habit and thought that we understand how our identity becomes part of the external world and how these actions can inform our internal thought. This would be something the realist might agree with. Actions in the external world cause changes in behavior that can then cause “real” changes to the intrinsic properties (our identities) of our being. Dewey would agree but push this conception farther by saying that even merely forming new knowledge about our habits (for example, instead of accessibility, maybe we could conceive of comfortability felt in conjunction with the habits themselves) can change our identities themselves. This line of reasoning doesn’t seem very detrimental, but it seems like the realist position about these causal relations would suggest this is horrible.
Let’s take the habit construction of gender for example. Gender is one of these constructions through which we are able to form our sense of self and the world around us. My birth as a female helped me then develop my identity as a woman in the world. I found security in knowing that I had patterns of actions and thought that I should follow. These thoughts of the world as a woman created a construction of the world around that was far different from that of a man. I learned quickly that my thought about the world should be that of caution and strength, that no matter the obstacle I faced as a strong woman I could overcome whatever I needed to. I learned that having caution and skepticism about the world around me was a part of good sense considering my social position in the world; so the question is why did I lose comfort in these thoughts. Suddenly being called my birth name and being referred to using she/her pronouns no longer felt like they were in accordance with my identity or the internal knowledge structure of the world I had created over a lifetime. The rigorous socialization of me as a woman suddenly became a source of great pain and confusion. This loss of comfort and huge gain in confusion lead to an entirely different world view, that of fear and hatred. Why couldn’t I be comfortable and what was I doing that changed my thoughts about the world so drastically? Like the nut, one day I read about non-binary trans identities and suddenly everything in my world view changed. The conception of world in which I did not have to restrict my thought about the world any which way created the liberation of my self and interconnected with this the transformation of the world around me. There were no more boundaries for my thoughts about the world and a vast new library of new knowledge I would have to discover.
Trans Identity and Non-Causal Impacts
Trans identity is necessarily understood by the larger cis-gendered society to be completely based in gender expression (action), but this conception of trans experience and identity is sufficiently inadequate. Cael Keegan spells out the nature of trans*ness in their paper about the film Bound created by the Wachowski sisters (at this time still identified as “brothers”), “Trans* thus marks ‘the capacity to transform one reality into another’ – how transgender phenomenology necessitates a ceaseless navigation between the tangible and intangible, perception and sense, the real and the imaginary.”[18] When we understand trans identity we must understand it as movement – thinking in terms of transformation and fluidity can helps to alleviate the misconception of transness as only based in how we act in the world, but more importantly how we think about the world. The trans experience is that of living between, through, and in resistance to constructions of society that do not connect with or fully understand your metaphysical positioning in the world. Trans gender expression is as much about an internal positioning of the self and the knowledge it possesses and changes as it goes through life as it is about physical action in the external world. Without understanding the essential combination of both the internal and external, the “comfortability” the trans experience allows for individuals dislocated from rigid gender roles is completely erased.
When we consider the real and Cambridge change distinction made by realists in conjunction with our understanding of trans identity, it becomes obvious that these distinctions miss the point of identity entirely. We need to understand both the intrinsic and extrinsic factors of our persona in order to fully understand ourselves and the world around us. Changing my thoughts about my identity and my being, causes an instant change to. The requirement of real changes suggests that in order to change our identities (our intrinsic properties), whether trans or cis, we must physically change our bodies. This requirement is obviously ludicrous. Why must I physically change my body in order for my thought and construction of my body in relation to the rest of world change? Whether trans or not, this conception of change does not fit how the world works at all. Anyone can change parts of their identity in any way they desire, this does not require we physically change our bodies to do so. What’s more important to consider is the fact that changes to our identity do change the way in which we view and understand the world around us, to against this idea would seem odd. My construction of the world as a non-binary person, means that any new knowledge I gain about the world is understood through the lens of this identity. By changing my identity I non-causally change the construction of the world around me, and I’m not sure how the realist could critique that conception.
The realist dislikes Dewey’s theory for the same reasons that trans voices are silenced, “Since the structure of the sexed and gendered world rests on foundations belied by our practices of self, we are a system of interlocking fault lines threatening to undermine that world’s structure, to shake it off its foundations and bring it crashing to the ground.”[19] The mental action that is required for trans life in the external world is based on fundamentally dismantling the foundations for which we have built a rigid world structure. Being trans means constantly resisting habits and constructions of thought that have been engrained in us since birth. It means fighting constantly to reconstruct the world to serve us instead of the other way around. Dewey’s requirement of thought creating non-causal changes to the external world is the basis for which we can understand trans thought and identity.
Bibliography
Dewey, John. “Human Nature and Conduct.” The Middle Works, 1899-1924 14 (1922).
Edited by J.A. Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 1983
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. “Dewey and the Question of Realism.” Nous (2013): 1-17. doi:
10.1111/nous.12059
Hale, C. Jacob. “Tracing a Ghostly Memory in My Throat: Reflection on Ftm Feminist Voice
and Agency.” You’ve Changed: sex reassignment and person identity, 43-65. Oxford,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Keegan, Cael. “Sensing Transgender.” Lana and Lily Wachowski, 1-23. Urbana, Illinois:
University of Illinois Press, 2018.
Sullivan, Shannon. “Reconfiguring Gender with John Dewey: Habit, Bodies and Cultural
Change.” Hypatia 15, no. 1 (Winter, 2000): 23-42. www.jstor.org/stable/3810510.
Footnotes
[1] Godfrey-Smith, 8. [2] Loc. Cit. [3] Godfrey-Smith, 5. [4] Dewey, 206. [5] Godfrey-Smith, 5. [6] Godfrey-Smith, 3. [7] Godfrey-Smith, 8. [8] Loc. Cit. [9] Comments by Dr. Howat [10] Godfrey-Smith, 8. [11] Godfrey-Smith, 8. [12] Godfrey-Smith, 9. [13] Godfrey-Smith, 10. [14] Godfrey-Smith, 11. [15] Sullivan, 31. [16] Sullivan, 28. [17] Loc. Cit. [18] Keegan, 3.